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Fertiliser Subsidies:  
Lessons from Malawi  
for Kenya
Since 2005/06 a large-scale agricultural inputs subsidy programme has been in place in Malawi, which, combined with 
good rains, has resulted in the country moving 
from chronic food insecurity to maize surplus. 
This in turn has excited interest in fertiliser subsi-
dies in other countries, including Kenya (itself 
chronically maize deficit). In this briefing note 
we summarise some of the key lessons learnt 
from evaluation of the Malawi fertiliser subsidy 
to date. Some of these are directly applicable 
to Kenya. However, the agro-ecological political 
and market contexts of Malawi and Kenya are 
different, so we also consider how these differ-
ences affect the transferability of the fertiliser 
subsidy programme.
Lessons from the Malawi Fertiliser 
Subsidy 
Lessons so far from the Malawi fertiliser •	
subsidy programme include the following:
In the first three seasons, the direct benefits •	
from the subsidy, in terms of increased 
production and income for producers, 
outweighed the costs of the programme, 
including administrative costs. (1) This is 
unlikely to be the case in 2008/09, as costs 
have risen (see Box 2).
Following the first season, there were also •	
large indirect benefits for poor households 
in the form of lowered maize prices and 
raised rural wage rates (2). Most Malawian 
households, including all of the poorest, buy 
more maize than they sell and many also 
rely heavily on hiring out their labour as a 
source of income.When the subsidy leads 
to lower prices, therefore, poor households 
benefit from the subsidy programme even 
where they are not direct recipients of 
subsidy vouchers and so see no benefit in 
terms of increased household maize 
production.
Maize marketing policy is a major factor •	
influencing the impact of fertiliser subsidies 
on the poor.
In Malawi, for much of 2006/07, a govern-•	
ment ban on maize exports depressed 
returns to fertiliser use, but benefited 
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consumers. This was then followed by offi-
cial maize exports that depleted national 
stocks, leading to subsequent price rises. 
Domestic maize prices were half of import 
parity levels in May-October 2006, one third 
of import parity in May-October 2007, but 
equal to import parity in May-October 2008. 
High maize prices contributed to the esti-
mated benefit:cost ratio above one for 
2007/08, but were damaging for the poor.
Delivering a subsidy through vouchers has •	
enabled many poor households to benefit 
directly from the programme and many 
more could do so if the rules for voucher 
distribution were further modified. By 
contrast, flat-rate subsidies on fertiliser price 
or transportation mainly benefit wealthier 
farmers who already consume most 
fertiliser. Where vouchers are used, the fiscal 
cost of the programme is also readily moni-
tored. However, distribution of vouchers is 
vulnerable both to political manipulation 
(for example, across regions) and to favou-
ritism by local officials. This is especially so 
when targeting criteria are not clearly stipu-
lated. Given the inherent difficulties in 
targeting, in Malawi some argue for a 
universal subsidy (voucher)entitlement, but 
of lower value per household. 
Before decisions are taken on targeting •	
criteria or universal subsidy, the objectives 
of the programme should be clearly articu-
lated. The concept of “productive safety nets” 
suggests that there is some overlap between 
reaching poor households and raising 
productivity, and this is indeed the case in 
The subsidy programme was introduced in 2005/06, so in 2008/09 is into its fourth season. From the 
outset the programme encompassed both fertiliser and maize seed subsidies (and has subse-
quently expanded to include selected additional inputs and crops). However, fertiliser subsidies 
- intended mainly for maize production, but some for tobacco - dominate the programme. The 
subsidies are delivered in the form of vouchers which are distributed to qualifying households, 
currently by Ministry of Agriculture staff working in collaboration with village development 
committees. In both 2007/08 and 2008/09 the intention has been to distribute fertiliser vouchers to 
1.7 million households, i.e. around half of the rural households in the country. Planned initial 
voucher distributions tend to be supplemented by secondary distributions. These represent 
adjustments to realities on the ground but also some patronage, the balance of which is difficult to 
discern.
In 2005/06 voucher recipients had to pay MK 950 (US$7.8) to “redeem” a subsidy voucher for maize 
fertiliser, meaning that a fertiliser voucher was worth roughly two thirds of the price of a 50kg bag of 
“maize” fertiliser (23:20 or urea). With rising fertiliser prices on world markets and domestic political 
competition for subsidy largesse, the value of the voucher has risen to over 90% of the price of a bag 
of fertiliser in 2008/09. Mainly for this reason, the cost of the programme has risen from an esti-
mated MK 7200 million in 2005/06 to over MK 30 000 million (US$217 million) in 2008/09.
In all years private importers have been involved in the importation of fertilisers for inclusion within 
the subsidy programme. However, retail sales of subsidised fertiliser have been dominated by two 
parastatal agencies, ADMARC and SFFRFM. A few large input supply companies were allowed to 
participate in retail sales of subsidised fertiliser in 2006/07 and 2007/08, during which years they 
accounted for 25-30% of subsidised fertiliser sales. Their involvement was discontinued in 2008/09. 
Much of the subsidised seed has, however, been sold through private channels, including local 
agro-dealers, and this continues in 2008/09. 
 
Source: Dorward and Chirwa 2009
Box 1: How the Malawi Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Programme Works
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Malawi. However, there is also some tension 
between these two objectives: the poorest 
households may not have the complemen-
tary labour or capital to make the most 
productive use of subsidised inputs. A 
modest degree of on-selling of vouchers by 
the poorest households isacceptable, espe-
cially if the secondary market for vouchers 
is such that they do not sell at a huge 
discount below face value. However, anec-
dotal evidence suggests that on-selling 
increased considerably in 2008/09, as the 
greatly increased value of each voucher 
raised the temptation for poor households 
to sell them.
The private sector was involved in the distri-•	
bution of subsidised fertiliser in 2006/07 and 
2007/08, but has not been in 2008/09. One 
consequence of this has been long queues 
to access fertiliser at parastatal sales points, 
with quick access only for those who can 
pay ‘tips’. This reduces the value of the 
subsidy to recipients. On the other hand, 
government and parastatal performance 
has also been improving in various ways 
over time, most notably in timeliness of 
tendering, hence also of delivery of fertiliser 
to production areas. Lack of trust between 
government / parastatals and the private 
sector is a big hurdle that has to be over-
come both for improving efficiency of the 
subsidy programme and for long-run ferti-
liser market development.
The introduction of the subsidy programme •	
has led to a major expansion in the Ministry 
of Agriculture budget. However, most of this 
money goes on the subsidy programme. 
Expenditure on agricultural public goods, 
essential for long-term increases in agricul-
tural productivity, has hardly increased and 
staff time is largely devoted to subsidy 
implementation. Thus, there is no clear exit 
strategy from dependence on subsidies. 
Introduction of a subsidy programme should 
be accompanied by a public debate about 
the desirable balance between short-term 
subsidy expenditure and investment to 
achieve long-term development goals for 
the sector, plus means to increase the 
productivity of fertiliser use.
In Malawi the details of the subsidy •	
programme have become the main subject 
of political debate, with parties competing 
to appear the most generous in the subsidy 
that they would offer. This is an indication 
of the patronage appeal of the subsidy 
programme to politicians: the opposition 
would apparently like to use it in the same 
way if they came to power. Unfortunately, 
this means that there has been little political 
debate about how to improve the efficiency 
with which the subsidy is administered or 
targeted. Even the exclusion of the private 
sector from distribution of fertilisers for 
2008/09 passed without critical comment 
from the opposition, despite the fact that 
this particular change is likely to be unpop-
ular with farmers. Lack of critical scrutiny of 
a subsidy programme from an active opposi-
tion allows inefficiencies to grow, increasing 
the chances that the costs of the programme 
will come to outweigh the benefits. 
 
We identify the following implications of this 
experience for Kenya:
Firstly, there is little room for inefficiency in •	
the administration of a subsidy programme 
if the production benefits are to outweigh 
the costs. However, unless there is a respon-
sible process of design supported with 
analytical capacity, costs are likely to balloon 
over time. Kenya currently lacks a strong 
political opposition but recently Parliament 
has begun and must continue to play an 
important monitoring role.
Secondly, the second-round effects on •	
maize prices and wage rates are critical if 
the poorest households are to benefit from 
a subsidy. These will only be achieved if the 
programme is implemented on a large scale. 
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Allowing maize prices to fall as production 
rises is also fundamental to poverty impact. 
However, prices should not fall so far that 
incentives for producers to expand input use 
disappear. This means that fertiliser subsi-
dies should be combined with output 
marketing policies designed to maintain 
maize prices within a band that is both remu-
nerative to producers and affordable to poor 
consumers. In Malawi official interventions 
in output markets during 2007/08 did not 
meet these criteria, reducing the poverty 
benefit of the subsidy policy.
Thirdly, a voucher-based system has the •	
potential to deliver a much greater share of 
the benefits to poorer producers than a flat-
rate subsidy on fertiliser prices, if political 
manipulation of voucher distribution can be 
contained and local allocation is done in a 
transparent manner. 
The Contrasting Contexts of Malawi 
and Kenya 
Malawi’s food crop farmers are more homoge-
neous than Kenya’s. For example, an average 
maize surplus producer in Kenya cultivates 
around 20 hectares, whereas an average 
maize surplus producer in Malawi cultivates 
In this briefing we focus on two major outcomes of the Malawi subsidy programme:
The benefit:cost ratio indicates whether the direct benefits from the subsidy, in terms of increased 
production and income for producers (who may or may not be poor), have outweighed the costs of 
the programme. This is the case if the ratio exceeds 1.00. 
We also consider the consequences of the subsidy and associated maize marketing policies on 
households that buy more maize than they sell. Many subsidy beneficiaries in Malawi fall into this 
category, but so too do many even poorer households, who also rely heavily on hiring out their 
labour as a source of income. 
In assessing outcomes, it should be noted that high maize prices raise the direct benefit:cost ratio of 
the programme, but at the same time dramatically reduce the indirect benefits experienced by poor 
maize consumers. An ideal outcome is a benefit:cost ratio greater than one achieved whilst maize 
prices are low (i.e. benefits driven by productivity gains, not high maize prices). This is what 
happened in 2005/06 and 2006/07. 
Year 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Benefit:Cost Ratio 
(medium response)
1.12 1.06 1.54 0.94
Impact on Poor Consumers Strongly positive: maize price 
lowered, rural wage rate 
raised
High maize 




By contrast, in 2007/08 a combination of adverse international maize prices and unhelpful domestic 
maize marketing policies caused maize prices to rise. High prices raise the benefit:cost ratio for the 
programme, but are disastrous for Malawi’s many poor maize consumers. Social impacts of the 
2008/09 programme are yet to be seen, but the rising cost of the programme means that direct 
costs are likely to exceed benefits unless a very high response to fertiliser application is achieved on 
farmers’ fields  
 
Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2009)
Box 2: Outcomes of the Malawi Subsidy Programme
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around 1 hectare. Malawi is also more 
homogeneous than Kenya agro-ecologically. 
This has at least two  important implications 
for fertiliser subsidy policy:
Technically, whilst a modest universal •	
subsidy (voucher) entitlement may be the 
most pro-poor option in Malawi, in Kenya it 
would be of limited benefit to the semi-arid 
and arid areas that comprise a large part of 
the country. Thus, some form of geograph-
ical targeting would have to be considered. 
Politically, whereas the top maize producers 
in Malawi are scattered across the three 
country’s provinces, in Kenya they are heavily 
concentrated in a few districts of Rift Valley 
Province (Nyoro et al. 1999). Historically, 
these Rift Valley producers have used their 
considerable political influence to obtain 
high producer prices from NCPB, raising the 
cost of maize for the majority of the popula-
tion (including both urban and rural poor) 
who rely on market purchases. However, in 
the past year the rents available from high 
producer prices have been squeezed by 
even more rapid increases in fertiliser prices, 
making a fertiliser subsidy an attractive 
option for them.
A fertiliser subsidy in Kenya could thus be 
designed in at least three ways.
A Malawi-style subsidy could distribute •	
vouchers widely across medium-high poten-
tial maize zones, thereby benefiting many 
poor rural households that are currently 
maize deficit, either directly through 
enhanced input access or indirectly through 
lower prices in local maize markets.
A flat-rate subsidy (perhaps covering internal •	
fertiliser transportation costs) would 
respond to political pressure from the 
producers of Rift Valley Province. Insofar as 
private fertiliser markets are competitive in 
the major medium-high potential maize 












A queue of people at a point of sale for state-subsidised maize and fertiliser.
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onto smaller producers, although the bene-
fits from such a subsidy would be propor-
tional to fertiliser use. Such a subsidy would 
undoubtedly cover a lower proportion of 
the fertiliser price than in Malawi and the 
resulting fertiliser price could still be at or 
above 2007 levels, suggesting that uptake 
by poor households would be limited. Thus, 
whilst justified on the grounds of raising 
national food supply (productivity) and 
lowering prices for consumers, one would 
have to question the extent to which the 
subsidy would raise total fertiliser use, rather 
than restoring rents for those who have 
traditionally been large users of fertiliser in 
maize production.
Administrative distribution of subsidised •	
fertiliser to well-connected areas and 
producers would generate the fewest bene-
fits to poor households, in terms either of 
direct access or of resulting lower maize 
prices. It would also come at the highest cost 
in terms of “crowding out” private sector 
distribution networks that have been devel-
oping successfully over the past 15 years 
and that are much stronger than in 
Malawi.
As in Malawi, a much more critical public 
debate is required about the objectives of ferti-














Urea fertiliser stocked ready for distribution.
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Endnotes:
(1) Calculation of these benefits is complicated by several 
factors, including the extent to which the subsidy has 
generated incremental fertiliser use as opposed to 
displacing market purchases, and the magnitude of the 
production response to incremental fertiliser use. (The 
latter is not directly measurable due to the unquantified 
influence of varying rainfall patterns on production). The 
benefit:cost ratio for the 2006/07 programme ranged from 
0.76 to 1.36 depending on the assumptions made about 
these variables. The figures in Box 2 assume a medium 
production response to incremental fertiliser use. 
(2) Increased production in one season influences maize 
prices in the next. Thus increased production in the 
2005-06 season influenced maize prices observed in the 
2006-07 season. and so on.
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